Introduction
The 1997-98 financial crises in the emerging markets have brought to the foreground the concern about offshore investment funds and their possible role in exacerbating volatility in the markets they invest in. Offshore funds are collective investment funds registered in tax havens, typically small islands in the Caribbean, Europe and Asia Pacific. Many or probably most offshore funds are so-called "hedge Robertson's Tiger Fund. Note, however, hedge funds can also choose to locate onshore (e.g., in the U.S.), particularly if they intend to trade primarily on the securities of major onshore markets (e.g., the U.S. stocks).
The regulatory and institutional environment faced by offshore funds can be quite different from onshore funds.
The host countries/territories of the offshore funds typically do not collect capital gains tax. More often than not, they typically do not forward the financial information to other tax and financial authorities either (even if the ultimate owners of the funds are located elsewhere). Furthermore, the regulation on these funds in the tax havens is often less stringent than that of major industrialized countries where most of the onshore investment funds are located. Helm (1997, p414) listed seven areas in which offshore funds face less regulations as compared with their counterparts in the U .S. For example, offshore funds would have greater flexibility and less procedural delays in changing the nature, structure, or operation of their products, and they would face fewer investment restrictions, short-term trading limitations, capital structure requirements, governance provisions, and restrictions on performance-based fees. While onshore mutual funds are generally prohibited from leveraging their positions (i.e., 1 Financial market participants and the IMF economists who worked on hedge funds confirm to us that many if not most offshore funds are hedge funds. However, the reverse is not true: hedge funds could also choose to locate onshore (e.g., in the U.S.), particularly those that choose to trade actively on the stocks in the major onshore (i.e. U.S.) markets.
borrow money to invest), offshore funds face no such restrictions unless they elect to do so themselves.
As a consequence, offshore funds may trade more intensely or aggressively than onshore funds because the zero or lower capital gains tax reduces the required expected gains from them to trade. They may also engage in trading behaviors that are different from their onshore counterparts. 2 For example, it has been alleged that foreign portfolio investors may engage in positive feedback trading (e.g., rushing to buy when the market is booming and rushing to sell when the market is declining), and are eager to mimic each other's behavior while ignoring information about the fundamentals. There is a concern that offshore funds may be more prone to this kind of trading pattern than their onshore counterparts, either due to the nature of their investment styles or due to lower regulatory constraints they face at home. Behaviors such as these by offshore funds could exacerbate a financial crisis in a country to an extent not otherwise warranted by economic fundamentals.
A better understanding of the offshore funds' behavior is highly relevant for the renewed debate on capital controls on short-term portfolio capital flows. Aside from outright capital controls imposed by capital receiving countries, one may imagine better supervision and r isk regulation by the governments of the capital-exporting countries as another way to regulate international capital flows. Indeed, many may prefer this approach to outright capital controls imposed by capital-importing countries. However, the presence of offshore funds adds challenges to this approach. Even when the G7 2 The actual difference in tax obligation between the offshore and onshore funds can be complicated. In our sample, those offshore funds that come from a jurisdiction that does not have a tax treaty with the Korean government are subject to withholding taxes imposed by the Korean government. There is a 25% withholding tax on dividends, but no tax on the capital gains if the investor owns less than 25% of the outstanding shares. A 10% surcharge (called "inhabitant tax") is added to the income tax but could be waived by a bilateral treaty. However, since most Korean stocks traditionally gives out only small amounts of dividends, it is possible for offshore funds to face no withholding tax at all. For onshore funds, the withholding taxes imposed by the Korean government depend on the bilateral treaty (if any) between the domicile of the funds and Korea. For example, for onshore funds from the U.S., there is a 15% withholding tax on dividends but no tax on capital gains. The 10% surcharge ("inhabitant tax" ) is not waived for American investors. See the Korea Stock Exchange Website, www.kse.org/kr/stat/index.html. Of course, offshore funds are not subject to any capital gains tax at home, but non-tax-exempted U.S. investors face a federal income tax (including dividend and short-term capital gains) at a rate between 15 to 39.6%, and a long-term capital gains tax at a 20% rate. They are subject to additional tax at a state level. However, the U.S. investors receive a tax credit for the withholding tax that they pay to foreign governments (up to the amount of what their U.S. tax obligation would have been if the dividends and capital gains had been derived from a U.S. source). The tax obligation for non-U.S. investors could be governments and the IMF can agree on a particular regulatory structure, it may not apply to the offshore centers. Moreover, many current onshore funds could migrate offshore as a result of changes in the regulations in their onshore domiciles.
The hypothesis that offshore funds may pursue destabilizing trading strategies can be connected with an emerging literature on behavioral finance, mostly in the domestic finance context. For example, using evidence from domestic market data, it has been argued that institutional investors often exhibit herding behavior, though the tendency is quantitatively small (see Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) .
There are also theoretical models in which rational investors may pursue positive feedback strategies, destabilizing prices in the process (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990) .
A number of authors have empirically examined the behavior of foreign investors in emerging markets. Schmukler (1996, 1998) have used the data on closedend country funds to investigate whether foreign investors move out of a country with an imminent currency crisis ahead of domestic residents. They reached a negative finding, suggesting that domestic residents are, on average, better informed than international investors. Choe, Kho, Stulz (1999) have examined the effects of foreign investors as a whole on the Korean stock prices. They concluded that foreign investors are unlikely to have played a big role in the market downturn, partly because they had been a relatively small part of the market. Froot, O'Connell and Seasholes (1998) have examined the relationship between aggregate portfolio flows into various countries and the returns of the stock market in these countries. They found evidence of a two-way impact: portfolio flows affect the returns in the emerging market and vice versa.
Different types of foreign investors may behave differently. Kim and Wei (1999) have compared trading behavior between individual versus institutional foreign investors, and between foreign investors who reside in Korea versus those who invest from outside the country. The evidence does suggest that it may be misleading to lump all foreign investors into one b asket. For example, foreign individuals tend to herd more than foreign institutional investors, and non-resident investors herd more than resident foreign investors. Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) examined the trading behavior of the mutual funds that invest in Latin America. They found evidence of positive feedback different depending on their own home-country tax laws.
trading both among the managers of the mutual funds and among the ultimate investors in the mutual funds. As far as we know, none of the papers in the literature has compared the behavior between offshore and onshore funds.
As stated earlier, this paper compares offshore versus onshore funds, rather than hedge versus non-hedge funds. Nonetheless, since most offshore funds are hedge funds, the literature on hedge funds is also relevant for our discussion. Fung and Hsieh (1997) , Ibbotson (1999) and Park (1999) pioneered the examination of trading strategies of hedge funds, many of them located offshore. They found that hedge funds appear to shift weights on different assets very frequently. The last paper found that the currency hedge funds were unlikely to have triggered the Asian currency crisis. Lacking the data on actual position holdings of the funds, these papers utilize return information to infer trading strategies a la Sharpe's (1995) style analysis. This is clever and very useful, but there can be errors if certain assets that the funds have actually traded on are not included in the analysis by the econometricians, and the omitted and included assets have correlated returns.
In this paper, we utilize a unique data set on actual month-end trading positions of foreign funds in Korea to study the behavior of the (non-pension) offshore funds. 3 To put the results in context, we compare them with three "control groups." The first is a group of mutual funds/unit trusts that are registered in the United States and United Kingdom.
The second is a group of mutual funds registered in eight continental European countries.
Finally, the third "control group" consists of mutual funds/unit trusts from Singapore and Hong Kong.
All three control groups have well-regarded securities and mutual fund laws and competent regulatory agencies. This is particularly true for the four countries in the f irst and the third group. 4 We include the funds from continental Europe to see if any inferences that we obtain regarding the behavior of the funds from the U.S. and U.K. are 3 Relatively few offshore funds are pension funds, which we have excluded to maintain comparability with the onshore mutual funds. 4 In a survey of firms reported by the Global Competitiveness Report 1998 (World Economic Forum, 1998) , the respondents were asked to rate the perceived adequacy of financial regulation. On a 1 (least adequate) to 7 (most adequate) scale, the United States and United Kingdom received an average of 6.53 and 6.36 scores, respectively. Both of them are among the top five most adequate countries in the sample of 53 countries. In addition, Singapore and Hong Kong (with the scores of 6.29 and 5.72, respectively) are also among the top fifteen countries in the country in terms of regulatory adequacy of financial institutions.
not peculiar to these two countries. We make Singapore and Hong Kong a separate control group because they, like the offshore centers, have zero capital gains tax on their funds, but unlike the offshore centers, do have a well-regarded regulatory system.
It is useful to note that the effect of foreign investors as a group was found t o be small on the Korean market volatility in 1997 in part because foreign investors were not a large part of the market (Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 1999 include Korea itself in the future), they could still contribute to the market volatility in a significant way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sets. Sections 3, 4, and 5 examine three aspects of foreign investor behavior, respectively: trading intensity, feedback trading, and herding. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
Data
Offshore and onshore funds and their positions We exclude funds from many other domiciles, such as Luxembourg, from the analysis because we cannot separate offshore from onshore funds registered in the same country.
We also exclude pension funds, commercial banks, investment banks, or insurance companies from our analysis, because relatively few of them from the offshore centers were active in Korea during our sample. communicating with KOSCOM is that they would register themselves either as mutual funds, unit trusts, or as "others". Notice that a hedge fund can either be an onshore or offshore fund. Our presumption would be that a greater fraction of the funds from our offshore group are hedge funds or pursue hedge-fund-like strategies than those from the U.S. and U.K.
The position data by investor and by stock is not generally available as they are not always collected. In our case, the Korean government's restriction on foreign ownership of Korean stocks and the need to enforce it helps to make this data available. Figures 1 and 2 plot the exchange rate (U.S. dollar/1,000 Won) and the stock market price index (KOSPI), respectively. Combining the two pieces of information, Figure 3 traces the dollar value of a $100 investment in KOSPI on January 1, 1997 throughout the sample (to December 28, 1999).
Sub-periods in the sample
We divide our sample into four sub-periods. 1998 when the currency market began to be stabilized. There were also some instances of labor unrest and major bankruptcies during the period.
the upper ceiling changed from 3% (Jan, 1992) à 4% (Apr, 1996) à 5% (Oct, 1996) à 6% (May, 1997) à 7% (Nov, 1997) à 50% (Dec, 1997) à 100% (May, 1998 
Intensity of Trading
Not having to pay capital gains tax at home and facing less supervision and regulation from home governments may induce offshore funds to trade more intensely than their onshore counterparts. In addition, investment funds that prefer to trade more actively may self-select to locate in the offshore centers.
In this section, we examine whether offshore funds actually trade more intensely or not. Because our data does not record within-month transactions, we cannot compute an accurate measure of turnover. However, we observe the total changes in the weights allocated to different stocks on a monthly basis. Our presumption is that, across investor groups, the total changes in the month-to-month weights are highly correlated with the true turnovers. We will use the term "trading intensity" in subsequent discussions to denote the changes in the weights on all the stocks.
Let w(k, j, t) denote the value of stock j held by investor k at the end of month t, divided by the total value of all stocks held by the same investor at the same time. We compute the sum of the absolute values of the changes in the weights across all stocks for investor k at time t using the following definition:
The average trading intensity (weight changes) for investor k defined as:
where T is the total number of months in the sample. Let K(i) be the total number of investors in investor group i (i = offshore funds, US/UK funds, etc). The average trading intensity for investors in a given group i is then the average of all TN(k) over all investors in the group i (subscript-i omitted):
Under the central limit theory, the TN measure is asymptotically normal. Table 2 reports, for each of the four groups of the funds, the trading intensity measured in this way. We see that, for each of the four sub-periods, offshore funds indeed trade more intensely than the onshore funds from the U.S. and U.K. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level for all sub-periods. Moreover, for the offshore funds, the trading intensity is the highest during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods.
We can perform a similar comparison of the offshore funds with the onshore funds from continental Europe. This time, the trading intensity is higher for the offshore funds in three out of four periods, but the difference is statistically significant only in one period.
The comparison with the funds from Hong Kong and Singapore is interesting. In each of the four sub-periods, there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups. Together, this suggests that the more intense trading by the offshore funds (relative to the U.S. and European funds) that we observe probably comes from the waiver of capital gains tax that their funds enjoy, rather than the laxity of regulation.
Future research is needed to confirm this conjecture.
The definition of trading intensity has an unattractive feature: if the prices of the different stocks fluctuate by a different amount, the value of intensity index changes even if no trading takes place. As a robustness check, we also implement a different definition of trading intensity in terms of changing weights in the physical shares of stocks. To be more precise, we let w(k, j, t) be the number of stock j held by investor k at the end of month t, divided by the total number of shares of all stocks that she held at the same time.
Then, TN(k) and TN are defined in the same way as before. The results are reported in Table 3 . We can see clearly that all the qualitative results from Table 2 remain to be true here. Thus, the offshore funds do trade more intensely than onshore funds (especially compared with those from the U.S. and U.K.) both before the crisis, and even more so during the crisis.
Positive Feedback Trading
There are concerns that offshore funds may engage in positive-feedback trading more aggressively than onshore funds, and that positive feedback trading could destabilize the market. A positive-feedback-trading pattern is when one buys securities when the prices rise and sells when the prices fall. This trading pattern can result from extrapolative expectations about prices from stop-loss orders --automatically selling when the price falls below a certain point, from forced liquidations when an investor is unable to meet her margin calls, or from a portfolio insurance investment strategy which calls for selling a stock when the price falls and buying it when the price rises.
Positive feedback trading can destabilize the market by moving asset prices away from the fundamentals. At least since Friedman (1953) , many economists believe that positive feedback traders cannot be important in market equilibrium as they are likely to lose money on average. This view has been challenged in the last decade or so. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) argued that in the presence of noise traders, even rational investors may want to engage in positive feedback trading, and in the process destabilize the market.
Empirical examination of this issue has emerged recently. Using quarterly data on U.S. pension funds in the U.S. market, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, LSV for short in later reference) did not find strong evidence of significant feedback trading.
On the other hand, and Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) Using transaction-level data, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) also find evidence that foreign investors as a group engage in positive feedback trading in Korea. No paper that we are aware of compares the positive trading tendencies of offshore versus onshore trading strategies.
To examine whether investors engage in positive feedback trading, we need to measure the connection between their trading on particular stocks and the prior performance of the stocks. Following a metric proposed in Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and modified by Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) , we adopt the following measure of momentum trading for investor group k:
where Q (k, j, t) is the number of shares of stock j held by investor (or investor group) k at time t, Q* (k, j, t) is the average of Q (k, j, t) and Q (k, j, t-1), and R (j, t-1) is the return on stock j from t-2 to t-1.
The momentum measure for a particular investor (or investor group) k over a given sample period is
where J is the total number of stocks traded by k, and T is the total number of time periods under consideration.
Under the null of no feedback trading (in either direction), the mean value of M (k) is zero. Furthermore, M (k) is asymptotically normal (as J and T approach infinity).
If there is systematic positive feedback trading, then M (k) would be positive. On the other hand, if there is systematic negative feedback trading, then M (k) would be negative.
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To avoid possible biases in quantifying the trading behavior, we exclude certain observations (investors or stock-month). First, investors who declare their purpose of the stock purchase as direct investment are e xcluded because they do not engage in active 7 Our data does not allow us to examine a portfolio rebalancing effect. Portfolio rebalancing normally calls for selling appreciating stocks and buying depreciating stocks, the opposite of positive feedback trading. So the presence of a portfolio rebalancing effect would imply that positive feedback trading may be stronger than our statistic suggests (but negative feedback trading may be weaker).
trading. Second, stocks not owned by any foreign investor in the previous month are excluded. Since short-selling is not permitted, any change in position in these stocks can only be a buy by foreigners. Third, stocks that have reached foreign ownership limit are dropped because any change in the net position of the foreign investors as a whole has to be a sell to Korean investors. The last two criteria are meant to minimize possible biases in computed momentum. Table 4 reports the basic finding on momentum trading. Let us start with the offshore funds (Column 1 of Table 4 ). For the first three sub-periods including the crisis episode, there is no statistically significant evidence that they engage in either positive or negative feedback trading. The exception is the recovery phrase when the offshore funds engage in contrarian trading. Table 4 ) are very similar to their counterparts from the U.S. and U.K. In particular, while they may engage in contrarian trading in non-crisis periods, they pursue positive feedback trading strategy during the crisis.
The funds from Hong Kong and Singapore display a weaker tendency to engage in momentum trading. However, they do engage in positive feedback trading during the crisis, which is similar to the funds from the U.S. and Europe, but different from the offshore funds.
To summarize, to the extent that positive feedback trading may be destabilizing in the emerging markets, the offshore funds in our sample are unique in our sample by not engaging in it. All three control groups demonstrate a statistically significant tendency to engage in positive feedback trading during the crisis (though contrarian trading during some other times).
In Table 4 , the returns on the stocks are measured in units of the local currency, the won. Since the investors in the sample are all international, maybe a more relevant measure of the return should be based on the U.S. dollar, which allows the impact of the exchange rate movement to be taken into account. In Table 5 , we re-compute the statistics of the momentum trading by using the U.S.-dollar returns. While the numerical values of the statistics vary from those in Table 4 , the qualitative features are very similar. Most important, we find that the funds in all the three control groups engage in positive feedback trading during the crisis, but the offshore funds are an exception to this pattern.
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A possible defense of positive feedback trading is that foreign investors (residing abroad) may be informationally disadvantaged relative to domestic investors. They may take a (relatively greater) decline in the price of a particular stock as unfavorable news revealed by domestic investors, and may therefore rationally choose to sell it (more aggressively relative to other stocks) (See Brennan and Cao, 1997, for such a model). It may be useful to check if the positive-feedback-trading pattern in our sample is ex post profitable. We do it in two steps. First, in each month, we form an equally-weighted portfolio of the ten best performing stocks, and another equally-weighted portfolio of the ten worst performing stocks, based on the previous month's return defined in won. The results are reported in Table 6 . 9 The average returns of the two portfolios in the previous months are reported in the first row of each of the four panels (representing the four different sub-periods) in Table 6 (labeled as "horizon -1"). Second, we track their performances over the subsequent six months. The results are reported in the other rows of Table 6 (labeled as "horizons 1-6"). We perform a difference in mean test (mean return of the past winners minus that of the past losers).
During the tranquil or pre-crisis period, there is no significant difference between the past winners and past losers in terms of their subsequent returns. However, during 8 In Appendix Table 1 , we re-do the momentum trading calculations for the full sample (i.e. without excluding the observations discussed in this section). The difference in momentum trading between the offshore and onshore funds becomes statistically insignificant in all sub-periods and for all pair-wise comparisons. 9 We have performed calculations using the U.S.-dollar returns. The results are qualitatively very similar to Table 6 with won-returns. They are not reported to save space. the crisis (as well as the recovery) stages, the relative ranking of the winners and losers reverses itself: on average, past winners tend to do worse than past losers in terms of the subsequent returns. This is true at all horizons from one to six months. The difference in performance is significant statistically at horizons over 4 months during the crisis. In other words, if one has to choose between a positive and a negative feedback trading strategy during this sub-period, the negative feedback strategy would have done better.
As a robustness check, we also form equally weighted portfolios of the 30 best performing and the 30 worst performing (based on previous-month's returns) stocks. The results are reported in the right half of Table 6 .
For these enlarged portfolios, again, there is reversal in the ranking of relative performance during the crisis. Again, a contrarian trading strategy rather than a positive feedback one would have been more profitable for this sub-period.
As qualifications, we note that our thought experiments above have not adjusted for risk levels of the stocks, and do not preclude the possibility that a positive feedback trading strategy could be profitable within a day or for horizons longer than six months.
We also make an attempt to compare the "risk-adjusted" performance of the positive and negative feedback trading strategies as actually pursued by some funds in our sample. We focus on the group of the U.S. and U.K. funds, as they are the largest group. Using a technique proposed by Grinblatt and Titman (1993) , we adjust for risk by comparing the returns of the new and the old portfolios of the investor. In other words, the risk levels on the new and the old portfolios are assumed to be similar so that the return on the new portfolio in excess of the old is naturally adjusted for its risk level.
We proceed in two steps. First, we classify all the investor-month pairs into two categories, positive versus negative feedback traders, depending on whether an investor's momentum measure, M, is positive or negative in a given month. Second, for each category, we compute the following risk-adjusted returns, averaged over all traders in the same group.
where K, J, and T are number of investors in the group, number of stocks, and number of months in the period, respectively. Lower case "n" in "Performance(n)" and R(j, t+n) denotes "return horizon." For example, R(j, t+1) and R(j, t+3) are the returns for stock j over 1 -month and 3 -month horizons respectively. Under the assumption that that the systematic risks for the old and new portfolios are (approximately) the same, "Performance(1)" and "Performance(3)"measure the risk-adjusted return for the new portfolio over one and three month horizons, respectively. 10 Table 7 reports the profitability calculations for the two trading strategies. Using this new definition of ex post profitability, the positive feedback trading looks less terrible. In particular, it appears to do better than a contrarian strategy before the crisis (at the o ne-month horizon) and during the recovery period.
However, it is precisely during the crisis, during which most funds were engaging in positive feedback trading, when such a strategy turns out to be unprofitable. To summarize, on the basis of the implied ex post profitability (without adjusting for risk), a contrarian strategy seems to dominate a positive feedback strategy. On the basis of a risk-adjusted measure of profitability, the positive feedback strategy looks better, though continues to be inferior to a contrarian strategy during the crisis episode.
Herding
Herding is the tendency that investors of a particular group mimic each other's trading. Portfolio investors may herd rationally or irrationally. Informational asymmetry may cause uninformed but rational speculators to choose to trade in the same way as informed traders (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992; and Banerjee, 1992) .
Since the informational problem may be more serious when it comes to investing in a foreign market than the domestic one, herding may also be more severe. Whether offshore funds herd more or less than the onshore funds depends on their relative capacity in collecting and processing information about the emerging market in question.
There is an alternative e xplanation for herding among institutional investors.
Unlike individual investors, fund managers face regular reviews (e.g., quarterly for mutual funds, and annually for pension funds) on their performance relative to a benchmark and/or to each other. This may induce them to mimic each other's trading to a greater extent than they otherwise would (See Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) . By this logic, whether the offshore funds herd more or less than the onshore funds depends on whether informational asymmetry is greater or less for them. By this logic, there might be less herding among offshore funds if they are subject to either fewer or less frequent performance reviews.
There have been several empirical papers that quantify herding behavior. Using data o n institutional investors, the pioneering paper by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (or LSV, 1992), followed by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) is defined as the herding index for investors in group i, on stock , j in month . t
(
H(i, t) is the herding index for group i in month t, averaged across all stocks. H(i)
is the herding index for group i, averaged across all months in the sample. In the
is subtracted to make sure that the resulting index is insensitive to general market conditions (i.e., a bull or bear market). By taking absolute values, the first term in equation (7) captures how much of the investment is polarized in the direction of either buying or selling. The second term i n equation (7) To avoid any possible bias in computing the herding indices, we exclude certain investors and observations (stock-month) from our sample. Like the sample we have constructed to examine positive feedback trading, we exclude here (1) direct investors, (2) stock-months for which the foreign ownership limit is reached, and (3) stock-months for which the stocks are not owned by foreign investors in the previous month. The last exclusion is motivated by the short-selling constraint. When short selling is not allowed, any trade on that stock would have to first show up as a buy, thus biasing the herding index upward (Wylie, 1997) . Finally, if a stock in a given month is traded by only one foreign investor in that group, that observation is dropped.
The basic results are presented in Table 8 . For each fund group i and sample period, we report the corresponding herding statistics, H(i), with standard errors in the parenthesis below.
Then we perform a sequence of difference-in-mean tests between offshore and onshore funds (reported in Columns 3, 5 and 7).
The most important findings are the following. First, for both offshore funds as well as the three groups of onshore funds, there is clear evidence of herding: the herding measure is statistically different from zero for all funds in each sub-period, except for the Hong Kong/Singapore funds in the pre-crisis episode. Second and most importantly, the evidence suggests that, t o the extent that there is a difference in the herding tendency, the U.S./U.K. funds herd significantly more than their offshore counterparts in two of the four sub-periods (and are comparable with the offshore funds in the other two subperiods). The offshore funds do herd statistically significantly more than the European onshore funds during the crisis episode. But this does not generalize to other sub-periods or to comparisons with other onshore funds. In Appendix Table 2 , we re-do the same calculations for the whole sample (rather than the restricted sample reported in Table 8 ).
Broadly similar results are obtained. One notable exception is that, in the full sample, the offshore funds no longer herd more during the crisis sub-period than the European onshore funds.
Collectively, the evidence rejects the presumption that offshore funds would generally herd more aggressively than their onshore counterparts. If anything, there is a bit of evidence that the U.S. and U.K. onshore funds can sometimes h erd significantly more than the offshore funds.
So far, we have seen evidence that investment funds do engage in herding, though offshore funds do not necessarily do so more than their onshore counterparts. It may be useful to investigate whether herding has actually been profitable for the funds at least on an ex post basis.
Let R(j, t, n) denote the return of stock j from t to t+n (in won). Let H(k, t) denote LSV herding index for stock j in month t . For each investor group, we run the following fixed effects regression:
(11) R(j, t, n) = α + stock dummies + time dummies
A "buy dummy" is defined as D (j, t) = 1 if B (j, t) / [B (j, t) + S (j, t)] > P (t) and 0 otherwise. P(t) is the fraction of all trades that is a buy. 1-D(k, t) is effectively a "sell dummy." The buy and sell dummies are used to measure possible profitability of buyherding and sell-herding, separately. If the stocks that investors herd to buy (or sell) tend to appreciate (or depreciate) more than the market average, we would expect to see â 1 > 0 and â 2 < 0.
We perform this regression for both the one-month and three-month investment horizons (i.e., n = 1 and 3). The results are reported in Table 8 . In overwhelming number of groups, we see that the estimates of 1 β and â 2 are not different f rom zero.
This means herding is not generally associated with abnormal returns. There are nine point estimates that are statistically significant. Among these nine, however, seven are of the wrong sign. In other words, the stocks that are herded to buy often experience a decline in value rather than an increase, whereas those stocks that are herded to sell often appreciate in subsequent periods. As another way to summarize this table, we observe that there is no single group of funds that have managed t o earn a profit from herding in more than one sub-period. There is no single sub-period in which more than one group of funds earns a profit from herding.
One possibility for investors to trade in a similar direction is that they all respond to common signals. Under the joint hypotheses that the investment funds respond to common signals and that the signals are payoff-relevant, we would expect that those stocks that the investors herd more aggressively should yield abnormal returns (relative to those stocks they do not herd as much). According to Table 9 , this joint hypothesis is not supported in the data for most funds and most sub-periods.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the behavior of offshore investment funds as compared with three groups of onshore counterpart (a) from the U.S. and U.K., (b) from continental Europe, and (c) from Singapore and Hong Kong. This is made possible by a unique data set that details the monthly stock positions of foreign investors in Korea as well as the home domicile of the investment funds.
There are a number of findings that are worth highlighting here. First, there is evidence that offshore funds indeed trade more aggressively than their onshore counterparts, judging from the average turnover. This "extra aggressiveness" by the offshore funds is more pronounced when compared with the onshore funds from the U.S.
and Europe, which are well-regulated and subject to a capital gains tax. But it is broadly similar to the funds from Hong Kong and Singapore, which are well-regulated but not subject to a capital gains tax. This suggests that zero tax rather than lax regulation enjoyed by the offshore funds may be more responsible for their extra intensity of trading.
Second, there is no significant evidence to support the allegation that the offshore funds engage in positive feedback trading. In contrast, there is strong evidence that funds from the U.S. and U.K. (and from the other onshore "control groups") exhibit a tendency to do so during the crisis period. To the extent that a positive feedback trading strategy by foreign investors may have exacerbated the volatility in the emerging markets, offshore funds are probably the wrong group to blame.
Third, offshore funds do herd. However, they do not necessarily herd more than onshore funds. Indeed, the evidence suggests that they often herd less than the funds from the U.S. or U.K. Again, if herding by foreign investors is considered undesirable, offshore funds would not stand out as the greater culprit.
A drawback of our data set is that we do not observe the asset holdings of the funds outside Korea. So we cannot make sweeping statements regarding the funds' overall trading patterns. However, the evidence so far suggests that the offshore funds are not the particularly worrisome monsters in the emerging markets. Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. In the left panel, two portfolios are formed each month and their performances in the subsequent 6 months are tracked. The first is an equally-weighted portfolio of the ten best performing stocks based on the previous month's returns, and another equally-weighted portfolio of the ten worst performing stocks based on the same criteria. The average returns of the two portfolios in the preceding month are reported in the first row of each of the four sub-periods. The returns of the two portfolios in the subsequent six months are reported in the rows that follow. In the right panel, two portfolios of the 30 best and worst stocks in terms of the previous month's return are formed. The returns in the subsequent six months are tracked in the same way as the two small portfolios in the left panel. US & UK investment funds are used in the calculation. To compute the profitability, a fraction of change in number of shares of investor k, on stock j, during month t is multiplied by return on stock j during the subsequent months (t +n). n can take either 1 or 3 depending upon the investment horizon. This is denoted as P (k, j, t, n) . To compute the average profitability measures of momentum and contrarian strategies, observations are divided into two groups: a momentum group is a set of observations with M>0, and a contrarian group of observations with M<0. For each group, P(k, j, t, n) is averaged across investors, stocks, and months. Each investor-stock-month is treated as a separate observation.
(1 
, is the ex post return of stock j from month t to t + n. H (j, t) is the herding on stock j at time t. D (j, t) and 1-D (j, t) are dummies for herd-to-buy and herd-to-sell, respectively. Standard errors and numbers of observations are in parentheses and squared brackets, respectively. 
